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China’s Socioeconomic Changes and the Implications
for the Religion-State Dynamic in China
Kim-Kwong Chan∗
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two years, most of the world’s media attention
has focused on the September 11th terrorist incident and the
resulting antiterror campaign, including the war against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan and the subsequent war against Saddam
Hussein in Iraq.1 However, most of China’s media attention has
centered on different events: China’s accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), China’s soccer team entering the World Cup
competition, Beijing’s successful bid to host the 2008 Summer
Olympic Games,2 and the recent changes in China’s political
leadership.3 These events, which differ from the concerns of the
Western world, signify China’s coming-of-age in the twenty-first
century and China’s emergence in the world’s political and economic
order. China has again reasserted itself as an important player in the
international community.

∗ Kim-Kwong Chan, Ph.D., D.Th., is the Executive Secretary of the Hong Kong
Christian Council, Honorary Research Fellow of the Universities Service Centre for China
Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Justice of the Peace of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. This paper was originally presented in February 2002 at the
Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., and will be published as a chapter entitled WTO
Accession and the Future of Church-State Relations in GOD AND CAESAR IN CHINA: CHURCHSTATE TENSION IN CHINESE POLITICS AND U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS (J. Kindroff & C.
Hamrin eds., forthcoming 2004). This paper has been substantially updated with references to
the new orientation of religious policies occurring in China since the beginning of this year.
Dr. Chan can be contacted at ckk@hkcc.org.hk.
1. See generally Patty Reinert, Year In Review 2001, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 30,
2001, at A1; Year in Review, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 29, 2002, at 006; Tom Zeller, The Year
in Review, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, § 4, at 2.
2. See, e.g., China Launches Global Search for Olympic Venue Construction Experts,
CHINA NEWS DIG., Feb. 10, 2004, 2004 WL 65926458.
3. The SARS crisis in 2003, of course, dominated the international media regardless of
national boundaries.
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Among these events, the Olympic Games and the World Cup are
a source of immense national pride.4 China’s new leadership has only
recently taken office but has already built a promising record by its
handling of the SARS crisis.5 However, China’s accession to the
WTO, completed in December 2001, bears important sociopolitical
significance and may change China permanently.6 There are
numerous studies examining the impact of WTO accession on
China, almost all of which focus on economic and administrative
issues.7 One area not yet addressed by commentators is how
accession will affect the religious dynamic and church-state relations
in China. Part II of this Article examines the general social changes
resulting from China’s WTO accession, while Part III discusses the
implications for religious development in particular. Part IV provides
an analysis of the government’s responses to these changes, and Part
V explores possible future ramifications on religious experience.
Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE WTO AND GENERAL SOCIAL CHANGES
With regard to many aspects of life in China, accession to the
WTO will bring a period of change unlike any other China has
witnessed in its rich history. That is not to say that accession will be
China’s first experiment with Western culture, foreign religion, or
even market capitalism. This Part will briefly recount some of
4. See, e.g., World Cup Exciting Opportunity for China, PEOPLE’S DAILY (May 31,
2002), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200205/31/eng20020531_96874.shtml.
5. See Loh Hui Yin, PM Goh Praises China’s Handling of Sars Crisis, BUS. TIMES
SING., July 26, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66189458 (“The way China was able to bring the
Sars epidemic under control showed that the new leadership could deal with challenges ‘firmly
and decisively’, said Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong yesterday. . . .”); see also Anne Hyland,
Asia Still Awaits SARS All-Clear, AUSTL. FIN. REV., May 8, 2003, at 12 (“To the extent that
the government’s response reflects a new adaptability, transparency and globality, the long-run
case for China may well be strengthened as a result.” (statement of Stephen Roach, Morgan
Stanley chief economist)); China Steps Up the Fight, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2003, LEXIS, News
& Business (detailing China’s fight against SARS).
6. See, e.g., CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Heike Holbig & Robert Ash eds., 2002) [hereinafter
CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO]; CONTEMPORARY CHINA: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE
AT THE START OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM (P.W. Preston & Jürgen Haacke eds., 2003)
[hereinafter CONTEMPORARY CHINA].
7. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Science published one of the most
comprehensive studies on the socioeconomic impact of accession to the WTO on China. See
CHEN CUNJIA ET AL., REPORT ON THE ISSUES RAISED FROM CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION
(2002). In this more than 500-page report, the authors made no mention of religious issues.
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China’s earliest encounters with market economics and Western
culture generally. In addition, this Part will explore some of the
general socioeconomic consequences of China’s membership in the
WTO.
A. A Brief History of China’s Experience with Market Capitalism
From the late eighteenth century until the early nineteenth
century, China enjoyed a considerable trade surplus with the
Western world, exporting more goods to Europe than it imported
from Western nations.8 At the time, China was not eager to open its
markets to overseas commodities. Western merchants, however, were
anxious to open China’s markets as an outlet for an oversupply of
goods produced in factories built during the Industrial Revolution.9
It was not until China began to import opium, which enjoyed
immediate popularity, that the balance of trade shifted from a trade
surplus to a trade deficit.10 As the payments required to purchase
opium increased, the negative trade balance literally bankrupted the
Chinese government11 and led to a trade dispute that resulted in the
infamous Opium War and the subsequent opening of China’s
markets to the West.12 Afterwards, China suffered economically as
government policies designed to protect China’s commercial
interests proved ineffective and local manufacturers were forced to
compete with lower-priced imported goods.13
Contemporary Chinese leaders and intellectuals often attribute
modern China’s economic woes to Western invasion and capitalist
8. See FOSTER STOCKWELL, WESTERNERS IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF EXPLORATION
TRADE, ANCIENT TIMES THROUGH THE PRESENT 74–75 (2003) (“At this time China
exported tea [and other goods]. In return, they imported little . . . . As Emperor Qinglong put
it, ‘The Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within
its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside
barbarians . . . .’”); see also IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 150 (5th ed.
1995).
9. KIM-KWONG CHAN & TETSUNAO YAMAMORI, HOLISTIC ENTREPRENEURS IN
CHINA: A HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES
FOR CHRISTIANS 6 (2002) (“Suddenly, China was flooded by all kinds of goods churned out
during the Industrial Revolution.”).
10. See STOCKWELL, supra note 8, at 74–75.
11. The Chinese government was technically the Qing Dynasty. Id.
12. See STOCKWELL, supra note 8, at 76–82.
13. P.W. Preston & Xing Aifen, State-Owned Enterprises: A Review of the Development
Dynamics, Contemporary Problems and the Shape of the Future, in CONTEMPORARY CHINA,
supra note 6, at 73.
AND
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exploitation, symbolized—or demonized—by the Opium War.14
Capitalism and market economies were regarded as evil; thus, to
avoid the stigma of national humiliation, China adopted socialism in
hopes of regaining its economic sovereignty and national dignity.15
Thereafter, China vowed that it would never again be subject to
foreign political and economic powers that attend capitalistic
economies.16
However, two decades ago, Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Open
Policy literally transformed the face of China from the largest stateowned collective corporation to potentially the biggest free market in
the world.17 During this time, capitalism was not discouraged but
rather embraced at all levels. Now, even entrepreneurs are invited to
join the once-proletarian Communist Party of China (CPC) as part
of the ruling elite. Western capitalists are welcomed with open arms
to invest in China in projects ranging from banking to railways.18
Unlike the Opium War, when China was forced to open its
markets to international commerce, China is now eager to join the
global economic order via the WTO and is opening its once jealously
guarded domestic markets to any foreign investors.19 China surely

14. Rosalie Chen, China Perceives America: Perspectives of International Relations
Experts, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 285, 286 (2003) (“The Chinese simply do not trust
American motives given their perception of American hegemony. They fear American
manipulation of China in international strategic terms, exploitation in economic terms, and
subversion in political and ideological terms.”); see also HSÜ, supra note 8, at 168–83.
15. Wei Pan, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, 12 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 3, 28–29 (2003) (“The legitimacy [of the communist regime] came from the fact that
[it] made the country ‘stand up’ to the powerful nations, and helped the nation as a whole to
regain self-respect.”); see also HSÜ, supra note 8, at 652–57.
16. STOCKWELL, supra note 8, at 173 (“Mao Zedong, the leader of the Communist
revolution had announced . . . ‘China must be independent . . . China’s affairs must be decided
and run by the Chinese themselves, and no further interference, not even the slightest, will be
tolerated from any imperialist country.’”); see also HSÜ, supra note 8, at 652–57.
17. Winberg Chai, The Ideological Paradigm Shifts of China’s World Views: From
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, 30
ASIAN AFF.: AM. REV., Fall 2003, at 163, 167–68 (“Deng’s goal in 1978 was to open China to
the outside world and transform it into a prosperous, modern, and powerful country by the
end of the twentieth century.”); see also CALLUM HENDERSON, CHINA ON THE BRINK: THE
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST MARKET 231–50 (1999).
18. Jeffrey E. Garten, It’s Time to Let China into the Clubhouse, BUS. WK., Feb. 2, 2004,
at 24 (“[China] has attracted more direct foreign investment than any country except the
U.S.”); see also Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
19. Li Tieying, The WTO and China, 30 FAR E. AFF., No. 3, 2002, at 87, 90 (“[B]oth
the world community and China realized that China needs the WTO and the WTO needs
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has traveled a long and twisted path from the Opium War to its
accession to the WTO.
Accession to the WTO requires China to grant foreign
merchants mutual market access through minimum trade barriers.20
Thus, economic sectors in China will compete with their foreign
counterparts on fair and open ground in the global market, each
relying mainly on its own economic strength. Further, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) will privatize into independent corporations
driven by the rule of the market rather than political decisions.21 The
government will no longer own and run businesses as a market
player but will instead act as a referee to supervise other players in
the market.22
B. The General Impact of China’s Accession to the WTO
On one level, accession to the WTO merely accelerates China’s
economic transformation by providing a defined timetable to lift
trade barriers.23 However, these changes constitute a socioeconomic
revolution that affects China no less dramatically than the

China. According to preliminary data, during the next five years, China’s demand for foreign
commodities will reach $1.5 trillion, which will give foreign enterprises the opportunity to
invest more than $300 billion.”).
20. Debra Vogler, WTO Entry Sweetens Foreign Investment in China, SOLID ST. TECH.,
Feb. 2003, at S7, available at http://sst.pennnet.com/home.cfm (“The significance of
China’s entry into the WTO is that it takes China out of U.S. domestic politics and—with the
resulting open markets, removal of non-tariff barriers, and lowering of tariffs—foreign direct
investment (FDI) will be encouraged.”).
21. Liu Junning, The New Trinity: The Political Consequences of WTO, PNTR, and the
Internet in China, 21 CATO J. 151, 157 (2001) (“The Chinese government cannot take sides
by giving special favors to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It will be obligated to treat all the
enterprises—regardless of whether they are state-owned, private, or foreign—equally. Such
treatment will speed up the disintegration of state ownership in China . . . .”).
22. See Russell Smyth & Zhai Qingguo, Economic Restructuring in China’s Large and
Medium-Sized State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from Liaoning, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 173
(2003).
23. By the end of 2006, China will have completely merged into the global economic
order. The WTO Web site, http://www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2004), provides a great
deal of useful information. For the official position of the Chinese government on accession to
the WTO, see China WTO Updates, at http://www.china.org.cn/english/21693.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004). For a more balanced view on China’s WTO accession, see SUPACHAI
PANITCHPAKDI & MARK L. CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA,
CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002).
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socioeconomic changes that took place when China adopted
socialism in 1949.24
This section will discuss the social implications of accession to
the WTO as well as the specific effects that lower trade barriers will
have on China’s various geographic regions and sectors of industry.
1. Changes in social classification and economic diversity
The changes in market structure brought about by accession to
the WTO will have significant social implications in China. For
example, SOE workers will no longer enjoy lifetime-guaranteed jobs
as before, and companies will be forced to go bankrupt if they do
not perform well enough.25 However, workers will be able to choose
their professions and to move to places where opportunities exist.
Such choices will inevitably transform the social classification and
lifestyle of the Chinese people.26 Recently, China’s population has
gradually moved away from the simple categories of worker, peasant,
and soldier—all cadres with relatively similar salaries. Last year, there
were more than ten different social classifications ranging from selfmade billionaire entrepreneur to SOE staffers earning $200 per
month to a CEO of a joint-venture corporation in Shanghai with a
monthly salary of $12,000 or more to a peasant in rural Gansu
making less than $10 a month.27 With such a diverse range of
incomes and multiple types of social classifications, China has
become an economically diverse society providing virtually unlimited

24. Tieying, supra note 19, at 87 (“[A] country with a five-millennium history and a
population of 1,300,000,000 people is actively and for the first time opening up to the outside
world . . . , and continuing the process of industrialization and modernization under the
conditions of division of labor, cooperation, and competition on a global scale.”); see also
HOONG YIK LUEN, NEW CHINA RISING: A SOCIAL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF WTO ENTRY
1–10 (2001).
25. Preston & Xing, supra note 13, at 80–86.
26. HIROSHI SATO, THE GROWTH OF MARKET RELATIONS IN POST-REFORM RURAL
CHINA: A MICRO-ANALYSIS OF PEASANTS, MIGRANTS AND PEASANT ENTREPRENEURS 110–
111 (2003).
27. In 2001, the Chinese Academy of Social Science commissioned a study to analyze
the changing social structure in China and to reclassify Chinese people into ten different
categories to reflect the current socioeconomic trend. The complete report was published in
February 2002 and is available in Chinese at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/
105530.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004). A subsequent report for 2003 is also available at
http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/250522.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
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options in lifestyles.28 People have a greater degree of freedom in
travel, housing, finding jobs, and choosing consumer goods.
2. Central and western regions: changes in the agriculture sector
In addition to social change, accession to the WTO will reshape
many sectors of the Chinese economy. One of the areas likely to be
devastated by lower trade barriers is the agricultural sector. Today,
about seventy percent of China’s population are peasant farmers, and
the price of grain in China is about twenty-five to thirty percent
higher than the price on the world market.29 Currently, the
government’s high purchasing price as well as high tariffs and low
import quotas protect Chinese peasants from cheaper grain
imports.30
However, under the mandate of the WTO, imported grain will
be allowed to compete in China’s domestic market with a relatively
low tariff.31 This is good news for the Chinese food processing
industry as well as consumers in general but bad news for the
peasants. The regions hardest hit by lower tariffs are the central and
western regions of China, where most of the population are farmers,
and most of the farms are low-yield plots.32 Many farms will go
bankrupt, and a large portion of the farming population will migrate
to urban areas to seek jobs. It is estimated that as many as one
hundred million bankrupt farmers, in addition to the one hundred
million surplus farm laborers currently dislocated, will flood the labor

28. See Dorothy J. Solinger, Chinese Urban Jobs and the WTO, 49 CHINA J. 61, 77–78
(2003).
29. This is the author’s estimate. For the current price, see the Web site of the State
Grain Administration at http://www.chinagrain.gov.cn/lm/engindex.asp (last visited Mar.
25, 2004). See also No Rural Idyll, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 10 (“[T]he price of
[China’s] grain is 15–20% higher than in world markets.”).
30. Susan D. Blum, Rural China and the WTO, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 459, 466
(2002); Flemming Christiansen, Will WTO Accession Threaten China’s Social Stability?, in
CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO, supra note 6, 188–89.
31. China Playing Greater Role in Global Grain Market, ASIA PULSE, Mar. 5, 2003,
LEXIS, News & Business (“Meanwhile, following its entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO), China has lowered tariffs for grain imports, increased its grain imports quota and lifted
various non-tariff barriers, which has made it a large market for major world grain
producers.”).
32. See Joseph Fewsmith, The Political and Social Implications of China’s Accession to the
WTO, 167 CHINA Q. 573, 578 (2001).
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market.33 Ultimately, these internal migrants will go to places where
they can make a living, and the resulting population migration will
reshape the demographic profile of China.34
3. Northeastern region: impact on heavy industry
Before privatization, China’s heavy industry sector, comprised
mostly of SOEs, employed almost 100 million workers.35 In general,
these SOEs were inefficient, overstaffed, and survived primarily on
political-based handouts from the government. However, from 1997
to 2002, SOEs eliminated more than fifty million jobs, and more job
cuts are on the horizon as China is determined to shake up these
SOEs through competition with the world market.36 Therefore, the
number of unemployed workers will continue to rise, and there is
little hope that these displaced workers will find jobs in the private
sector. The private sector has traditionally recruited more skillful and
younger workers, including fresh graduates who are easier to train.
Yet these fresh graduates are also having a hard time entering the
labor force.37 The heavy industries are concentrated in China’s Rust
Belt—the northeastern region of China, as well as some central and
western regions.38 Consequently the economic outlook for these
regions is less than optimistic.
4. Coastal region: effects on light industry
Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Open Policy was first applied in
China’s coastal region twenty years ago. Since then, this policy has

33. See PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NATIONAL CHAMPIONS,
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS REVOLUTION 218 (2001); Fewsmith, supra note
32, at 578.
34. See Christiansen, supra note 30, at 189; Joseph Fewsmith, The Political Implications
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, in CHINA’S AGRICULTURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM 125, 125–33 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed., 2001); Michael
Webber et al., Making Markets, in CHINA’S TRANSITION TO A GLOBAL ECONOMY 61, 84–88
(Michael Webber et al. eds., 2002).
35. Mark L. Clifford et al., Can China Reform Its Economy?, BUS. WK., Sept. 29, 1997,
at 116 (“[T]here also are thousands of hopelessly unprofitable industrial dinosaurs . . . on
whom 100 million workers depend for survival . . . .”).
36. See Matthew Forney, Workers’ Wasteland, TIME INT’L, June 17, 2002, at 40, 40–47.
37. Several years ago, enrollment in China’s tertiary education system doubled; hence,
more graduates are now fighting for jobs in the market. See Linda Yeung, China Near Top of
Private-Finance Table, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 14050670.
38. NOLAN, supra note 33, at 219; Fewsmith, supra note 32, at 579–80.
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provided wealth and commercial experience to the region. In
addition, the region’s manufacturing and export facilities are already
well established. Thus, the coastal region has enjoyed a head start as
China has begun opening to foreign investment.39
As a result, wealth and opportunity are more concentrated in the
coastal region, in such places as the Pearl and the Yangtze River
deltas. As discussed above, the economic push and pull of the labor
market will likely continue to draw talented people and resources
into these coastal areas.40 Accession to the WTO will further enhance
the prosperity of this region because its primary industries, including
finance, high-tech, and service, stand to benefit from accession to the
WTO.
Foreign investors in general favor this region for its wellestablished business infrastructure and advanced logistical support.41
China received $60 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
year 2002, the largest amount received by any country, including the
United States.42 Most of this investment was concentrated in the
coastal region. As a result, millions of new jobs will be created, and
business people all over the world will converge at the new
international business hub of Shanghai. Soon, the coastal region will
likely be the wealthiest part of China and perhaps one of the most
prosperous regions in the Pacific Rim.
III. IMPLICATION ON RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS
In addition to bringing a wave of socioeconomic change to
China, accession to the WTO also promises to inspire a religious
revival in Chinese society. This section discusses three primary causes
of this impending spiritual revolution. First, as China is beset by the
social and economic upheaval accompanying accession to the WTO,
many people will likely turn to religion as a source of stability and
guidance in solving life’s persistent questions. Second, as lower trade
barriers increase China’s international profile and interface with
39. See Khorshed Chowdhury et al., Regional Income Inequality in China, in
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION 238,
238–61 (Charles Harvie ed., 2000).
40. Christiansen, supra note 30, at 189.
41. See, e.g., Ashwini Deshpande, Tale of Two Cities: Regional Inequality in China on the
Eve of Its Entry into WTO, 38 CHINA REP. 523 (2002).
42. For FDI trends in China, see Jai S. Mah & Kyung-sun Yoo, The Relationship
Between FDI Regulations in China and the WTO, 36 CHINA REP. 191, 191–92 (2000).
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foreign nations, China will become an importer of not only
consumer goods but also cultural and religious influences. Finally, as
the labor market restructures and hundreds of millions of dislocated
workers migrate within and without China, an internal crosspollination of ideas, including traditional religious thought, will
occur between regions once isolated by geography and politics. This
section describes these causes in detail and explores the challenges
that have arisen as China and its global neighbors attempt to adjust
to the new religious realities in China.
A. Religion as a Source of Stability
All of the changes discussed above—economic polarization,
regional differences, dynamic flow of population, new classification
of social categories, and increased opportunities—will radically
reshape post-accession China into a society full of paradoxes. It will
be a society that opts for an open market but remains under
autocratic rule, a land where the extremely rich and the extremely
poor coexist, a job market filled with both opportunity and
devastation, a ruling Communist Party (CPC) with capitalist
members trying to protect the proletariat, and a market policy
advocating survival of the fittest in a socialist society attempting to
fairly distribute resources to all people. WTO accession has generated
an atmosphere of euphoria, optimism, and opportunity for some,
and uncertainty, instability, ambiguity, and insecurity for others. It
seems that when paradigms shift, as they have in the radical
socioeconomic transformation China is now experiencing, people
often look to religion as a source of stability.43 Although the
Communist Party’s teaching is the official ideology, it is far from
widely accepted.44 Religion has become an attractive option for
people facing change to seek new meaning in life.45 This trend is
43. Christiansen, supra note 30, at 186; see also RELIGION UNDER SOCIALISM IN CHINA
101–12 (Luo Zhufeng ed., Donald E. MacInnis & Zheng Xi’an trans., 1991).
44. See Clay Chandler & Phillip P. Pan, China’s Leaders Uneasy About WTO Entry,
WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2001, at A27 (“That strategy has proved an enormous success: The
economy flourished, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and winning popular support
for the Communist Party long after China’s people stopped believing in communist
ideology.”).
45. Bryan Edelman & James T. Richardson, Falun Gong and the Law: Development of
Legal Social Control in China, 6 NOVA RELIGIO 312, 327 (2003); Scott Lowe, Chinese and
International Contexts for the Rise of Falun Gong, 6 NOVA RELIGIO 263, 266–67 (2003);
Richard Madsen, Understanding Falun Gong, 99 CURRENT HIST. 243, 247 (2000).
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already evident in economically depressed areas such as Henan, an
area with a large farming population that lags far behind the nation’s
economic progress.46 It is also evident in areas experiencing an
economic boom such as Wenzhou, which claims the highest number
of merchants per capita in China.47 It is in these areas that religion is
experiencing the fastest growth. The growth of religion includes the
officially sanctioned faiths, such as Christianity and Buddhism, as
well as those unsanctioned religious sects like Falungong (banned in
China and labeled evil cults by officials)48 and the so-called cults such
as Eastern Lightning.49 In short, there has been a growth of religion
as China heads towards accession to the WTO.
B. Influence from Foreign Nations
Accession to the WTO will also usher in a new wave of foreign
influences as multinational corporations (MNCs) compete for market
share in the newly available Chinese domestic market. Average
Chinese citizens will also likely pay more attention to the
international scene, be it economic, political, or cultural. This will
allow Chinese people more contact with foreign values, including
religions such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam.50 With more

46. See Members of Chinese Underground Church to Be Handed ‘.Heavy.’ Sentences,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 9, 1999, LEXIS, News & Business (“The Information Centre has
recorded 233 Christianity-related arrests in the province of Henan, a hotbed of the faith’s
growth with an estimated five million followers, since October.”).
47. Wenzhou is a coastal city in the Zhejiang Province with its own dialect, which is
incomprehensible to others. Wenzhou’s people are famous for their independent spirit and
entrepreneurship. It was the first region to take advantage of the Reform and Open Policy
permitting the establishment of private enterprise. Wenzhou merchants are not only all over
China, but are also scattered in most of the emerging markets in the world. In the year 2000,
ninety-eight percent of Wenzhou’s GDP came from private enterprise, the highest percentage
among all municipalities in China. See David Murphy, Charge of the Lighter Brigade, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Aug. 23, 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/iprcn/feerfeature.htm.
48. Police Hold Falun Gong Protesters, MORNING STAR, Feb. 15, 2002, at 3 (“China
banned Falun Gong as an ‘evil cult’ in 1999.”); see also CRIMINAL LAW, art. 300 (1997)
(P.R.C.).
49. Eastern Lightning is one of many pseudo-Christian sects to have developed in
China. Chinese authorities regard these groups as evil cults; the Chinese government’s list and
descriptions of these groups are available at http://www.china21.org (last visited Mar. 25,
2004), or visit Eastern Lightning’s own site at http://www.godword.org (last visited Mar. 25,
2004). Christian circles generally regard these sects as heresies and cults. See
www.chinaforjesus.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
50. See Dru C. Gladney, Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?, 174 CHINA Q.
451, 463 (2003).
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access to Western civilization via commercial activities, there may
well be more contact with Christianity and other religions by average
Chinese citizens who hitherto may have had only limited exposure to
these ideas. Furthermore, many mission-minded religious
organizations may use accession to the WTO as a window of
opportunity to launch campaigns into China, whether it be to
support existing Chinese religious organizations or to launch out
into frontier areas. These efforts may lead to an increase in the
overall influence of religion in China.
Religion is no longer a taboo subject or an outdated ideology, as
formerly asserted by the CPC; Chinese people can now discuss
religion as part of the heritage of the world’s civilizations. More
foreigners will likely come to work in China as the accession to the
WTO increases the tempo of foreign involvement.51 These
expatriates will not only cluster in the major trading cities such as
Shanghai and Beijing, but will also spread around smaller cities in
China’s interior, bringing with them their lifestyles, values, and
religious faiths.52 While there are already well-established expatriate
religious communities in major cities, from Jewish synagogues to
Mormon chapels, there will be an expansion of new expatriate
religious communities sprouting up across China in places where
foreigners reside.53
As more commercial transactions take place between China and
other countries, cultural and religious influences will inevitably
follow.54 Some religions not on the list of officially sanctioned
religions in China (Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Daoism,
and Islam) may find their way into China through these interactions.
For example, some Chinese citizens may have accepted the Mormon

51. UPI Hears . . ., UNITED PRESS INT’L, Jan. 7, 2004, LEXIS, News & Business
(“[T]he Ministry of Public Security has drawn up plans for a long-term residence permit ‘green
card’ system for foreigners in an attempt to attract more senior experts and funds from
abroad . . . . According to 2001 statistics, more than 60,000 registered foreigners live and
work in China.”). There are an increasing number of services available for expatriates in China.
See, e.g., http://www.chinastrategic.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
52. This is the author’s observation of the situation in more than fifteen provinces from
2001 to 2003.
53. This is the author’s observation, derived from communications with leaders of
expatriate religious communities in more than ten cities from 2000 to 2003.
54. See, e.g., Tony Lambert, The Present Religious Policy of the Chinese Communist Party,
29 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 121, 127 (2001).
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faith while doing business in the United States.55 When they return
to China, they may introduce their new religion to friends and
neighbors. Some Chinese may embrace Greek Orthodoxy,
Hinduism, or Ba’hai, for example, while they are stationed overseas
for commercial or academic activities.
These religions, although not currently recognized by the
Chinese authorities, are generally accepted by the international
community as legitimate faiths. Therefore, it will be increasingly
difficult for the Chinese authorities to continue to reject these
groups. The presence of these new religions will likely challenge the
tolerance of government officials and may eventually lead to a
confrontation on the current religious policy, an issue that the
Chinese government must face vis-à-vis accession to the WTO. For
example, there are currently more than 700 Russian Orthodox
expatriates residing in the Shenzhen and Guangzhou areas, and the
Russian Orthodox patriarch has already assigned a priest to care for
the religious needs of these people.56 China will soon face demands
from these and other foreigners to have more international
chaplaincy services provided for their Chinese adherents. Because
many of these religious groups have no counterparts in China, unless
some accommodations are made, officially sanctioned groups may
find it difficult to provide spiritual services for these foreign groups—
a situation unforeseeable just a few years ago. This situation is further
complicated as more foreigners and local Chinese citizens intermarry.
The current policy separating religious services for foreigners and
nationals may face challenges dealing with the new reality of families
of mixed nationalities affiliating with foreign religious groups that
may or may not be one of the five recognized religions in China.57
Can foreigners attend an expatriate religious service with Chinese
national family members who would be barred from these services
under the current policy? Can foreign clerics minister to their own

55. See, e.g., Amy Choate, Asian Students Find a Home Away from Home, BYU DAILY
UNIVERSE, May 21, 2003, http://newsnet.byu.edu/story.cfm/44327; Lois Hassell, BYU
Creates Chinese First Ward, BYU DAILY UNIVERSE, Mar. 27, 2000, available at
http://newsnet.byu.edu/story.cfm/8662.
56. This information was gathered from personal communications with Priest Dionisy
Pozdnyaev in Hong Kong during March and November of 2003.
57. To view the Amity Foundation’s site on the current religious regulations in China,
see http://www.amityfoundation.org/ANS/Religious%20Laws.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2004).
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people and their Chinese spouses and dependents in China?58 These
scenarios are stretching the limits of the existing regulations, which
are far from adequate to address these issues.59
C. Revival of China’s Indigenous Faiths and Interaction
with Other World Religions
With accession to the WTO and the rise of regionalism, China
will become more socially and economically diverse.60 One of the
hallmarks of Chinese regionalism is a culture consisting of legends
and local deities.61 Recently in China, there has been a marked
resurgence of local folk religion. For example, the birthday of Mazu,
the local deity in Fujian and Taiwan, has become a local festival and
may become the new focus of these communities.62 Such a focus
would help to shape a new local identity and may avert the identity
crisis that so often appears after the loss of traditional nationwide
social classifications.63
The wealth generated from commercial activities, especially in
coastal provinces, will fuel these religious developments and
strengthen each community’s identity. This has already been seen in
a rapid increase of temples built to honor traditional local deities in
coastal regions where wealth has concentrated.64 Even in povertystricken places, such as the Northern Yellow-Earth Plains in Shaanxi,
the increased popularity of local temples and deities seems to suggest
that local peasant farmers have more confidence in petitioning local
deities for help than the local government, even in times of drought
or other crises. The general loss of confidence in secular authority
has prompted these peasant farmers to seek assistance from the
58. Signed by Premier Li Peng in 1994, Decree 144, article 3, requires clergy to obtain
approval before conducting religious services. See Regulations Governing the Religious
Activities of Foreign Nationals Within China (1994), available at http://www.amity
foundation.org/ANS/Religious%20Laws/reg1.htm.
59. For a relatively comprehensive set of regulations, see QUANGUO ZONGJIAO
XINGZHENG FAGUI GUIZHANG HUIBIAN [COMPILATION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON RELIGION] (2000).
60. See, e.g., Deshpande, supra note 41.
61. See generally JOSEPH A. ADLER, CHINESE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS 113–21 (2002).
62. Id. at 103–04.
63. See DONALD E. MACINNIS, RELIGION IN CHINA TODAY: POLICY AND PRACTICE
192 (1989); FOSTER STOCKWELL, RELIGION IN CHINA TODAY 262–64 (1993).
64. See, e.g., Kenneth Dean, Local Communal Religion in Contemporary South-east
China, 167 CHINA Q. 338 (2003).
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transcendent world, which is becoming more and more a part of the
daily reality in modern China.65
In addition to providing communities with a renewed sense of
identity, the revival of China’s folk religions is likely to have a
significant impact on religious observance in greater China and
perhaps in other areas of the world. For example, within China, the
government has been rather ambivalent towards traditional Chinese
folk religions.66 While folk religion does not have the same status as
either Buddhism or Daoism,67 the government does not eliminate it
by force and generally tolerates it.68 But there are signs that the
government is trying to regulate the spontaneous activities of folk
religion by experimental administrative measures.69
In addition, as accession to the WTO affects population
migration patterns, it will also affect the dissimilation of and the
interaction between religions and religious ideas in the interior of
China. Just as the staggering number of internal migrants and
transients, currently at least ten percent of the population, or 130
million people,70 will bring new socioreligious dynamics to China,
65. Id. at 342.
66. Compare Regulations on Religious Affairs of the Province of Guangdong, art. 24
(2000), http://www.zytzb.org.cn/zytzbwz/flfg/zj5ab.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004),
translated in Five Provincial Level Official Regulations on Religious Affairs, 36 CHINESE L. &
GOV’T, 49, 60–68 (2003) [hereinafter Five Provincial Regulations] (prohibiting “other
superstitious activities, which do not fall into the category of religion”), with Regulations on
Religious Affairs of the City of Beijing (2002), http://www.beijing.org.cn/3925/2002-8-7/
182@363304.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004), translated in Five Provincial Regulations,
supra, at 49–54 (containing no such prohibition).
67. See ADLER, supra note 61, at 113–21; STEPHAN FEUCHTWANG, POPULAR
RELIGION IN CHINA: THE IMPERIAL METAPHOR vi (2001).
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, CHINA: STATE CONTROL OF RELIGION 36–38
(1997). Also, the Regulations on Religious Affairs of the City of Beijing, supra note 66,
contains no such prohibition on superstitious activities.
69. See Namping Municipality, Concerning the Temporary Measures to Regulate Folk
Religious Activities, 34 FUJIAN RELIGION 47 (2003).
70. This figure represents the aggregate dislocation caused by WTO accession. See
Transient Children More Likely to Drop Out of School: Survey, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Nov.
5, 2003, LEXIS, News & Business (“According to the fifth national census in 2000, children
under 18 account for 19.37 percent of the country’s 100 million transient population.”).
There is no precise statistic for migrant laborers, but the government estimates that there were
at least 130 million surplus farming laborers at the end of the 1980s and there were at least
eighty million migrant laborers in the mid-1990s. It is reasonable to suggest that this figure
has been on the rise as more surplus farming laborers have been flooding to cities during the
past five years creating a major social concern. For the government’s recent studies on this
issue, see http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/mingong/351589.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2004).
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this increased mobility will also allow China’s indigenous faiths to
become interspersed with others around the world.71 First, these
internal migrants are generally highly susceptible to religion.72 For
example, many uprooted peasant farmers, working in coastal
factories and longing for communal support, may, during this
transient period, find the faith, hope, and care necessary to sustain
them in local Christian churches.73 Many of these workers who
embrace new forms of faith while living elsewhere may bring their
faiths home to villages that had no such religious traditions.74 The
transmission of religion may thus occur in unpredictable ways, for
there is no clear pattern to how a peasant worker may travel.75
Second, increasing market opportunities in remote places will
prompt both Chinese and foreign business people to travel to
obscure and hard-to-reach places, bringing with them new
commodities and religious thought hitherto unknown to China’s
most isolated communities. Many of these merchants, especially
those from Wenzhou, are religious believers who may spread their
faith along with their merchandise. For example, Wenzhou
merchants established perhaps the only government-sanctioned
Christian gathering point in Lhasa, Tibet.76 Thus, there will likely
soon be small clusters of religious believers in places where no one
would have thought they could exist, and these new religious
assemblies may live in harmony or in tension with the already
existing religious groups.77
WTO accession also impacts Chinese religious believers beyond
the borders of China. One of the opportunities provided by
accession to the WTO is for Chinese merchants to capture a share of
the global market. Chinese merchants have already made inroads to

71. Carlos A. Magariños & Francisco C. Sercovich, China’s Accession to the WTO: An
Overview of Domestic and External Implications, in CHINA IN THE WTO: THE BIRTH OF A
NEW CATCHING-UP STRATEGY 1, 3 (Carlos A. Magariños et al. eds., 2002).
72. Daniel H. Bays, Chinese Protestant Christianity Today, 171 CHINA Q. 488, 501
(2003).
73. CHAN & YAMAMORI, supra note 9, at 35.
74. Id.
75. Webber et al., supra note 34, at 84–88.
76. CHAN & YAMAMORI, supra note 9, at 34.
77. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2003: CHINA, http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/irf/2003/23826.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
REPORT].
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newly emerging markets in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Southeast
Asia, and the Middle East, especially in such commodities as electric
household appliances, clothing, and motorcycles.78 Many of these
merchants are religious believers, and they may also spread their faith
along various trading routes. For example, Chinese Christian
merchants have already established their own churches or fellowships
in most major European cities and in places like Ulan Baator,
Mongolia; Bucharest, Romania; Budapest, Hungry; and Khabarovsk,
Russia.79 Similarly, Chinese immigrants, legal or otherwise, may
bring their own local deities along to the new places they settle. In
the future, it may be possible for Chinese nationals to practice Mazu
worship in places like Brooklyn. And for the present, immigrants
who revive traditional folk practices are contributing to their local
Chinese communities as religious groups may often be among the
few associations organized to provide social support and services for
their kinsmen.80
The exchange of religious ideas between China and the rest of
the world is not without its challenges. If accession to the WTO
opens doors for Chinese religious believers to have access to other
parts of the world, the missiological and ecclesiological significance
cannot be underestimated, especially as the Chinese are politically
accepted by virtually every nation, even by those missiologically
hard-to-access nations such as North Korea, Cuba, and Iraq.81
Further, there will be new dynamics to be resolved between migrant
religious groups and local religious groups, particularly if the groups
formed by migrants have a stronger affiliation with their
coreligionists at home than with those living next door in the host
country. One can imagine the irony of a Chinese protestant group in
Wittenberg, Germany that knows nothing about Luther, has nothing
to do with the local Lutheran Synod, and, in fact, is an offshoot from

78. CHAN & YAMAMORI, supra note 9, at 41.
79. Id.
80. This author has encountered numerous forms of folk religious practices as well as a
workshop of regional deities by Chinese immigrants who brought these practices from their
home towns or villages to North America.
81. CHAN & YAMAMORI, supra note 9, at 41 (focusing on the missiological dimension
of Chinese Christian business people).
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a nonregistered church in Henan and uses hymns printed in
Nanjing.82
The resolution of these issues remains uncertain. However, it is
certain that, whether as a result of increased intercourse between
China and its trading partners or to fulfill a need for constancy in an
ever-changing world, religious sentiment is increasing in China, and
this increase can be traced to its accession to the WTO.
IV. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE RELIGIOUS
IMPLICATIONS OF WTO ACCESSION
WTO accession ushers in a whole new range of social challenges
for the Chinese government to tackle—from labor unrest caused by
unemployment to the tensions caused by economic polarization. The
Chinese government faces unprecedented challenges trying to lead
China back into the international community as a significant power
while simultaneously maintaining the CPC’s absolute control within
China. In the past few years, the Chinese government has conducted
a series of studies on post-WTO accession assessments and has
formulated policies on the aforementioned political objectives.83
During the past few years, religion was ignored as a minor social
issue. But in December 2001, President Jiang Zemin called a
Religious Work Conference attended by the full Politburo, the top
leaders from all branches of the government, the CPC, and the
military.84 This conference signified an adjustment in religious policy
designed to deal with the religious growth predicted to accompany
post-accession social adjustment in China.85 At the time, there were
debates within the party as to what the religious policy should be
when China entered the WTO.86 Should the Chinese government let
go of its control over religion just as it had done with economic
82. Would such a church infringe upon the sovereignty of the local German church, as
strongly suggested by the Chinese authorities?
83. See the government’s WTO sectoral assessment report at http://www.china.org.
cn/chinese/zhuanti/pinggu/414383.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
84. The full report of this Conference and President Jiang’s speech were published in
Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] on December 13, 2002. Subsequent articles commenting on
the speech were published in the party’s internal bulletin, Tongxin [Communication], Jan.
2003, 1–20.
85. See Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], Dec. 13, 2002; Tongxin [Communication], Jan.
2003, 1–20.
86. This information was gathered by the author from personal communications with a
confidential source.
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matters when China merged into the global economic world order?
Or should the government suppress the growth of religion because,
according to party orthodoxy, all religions amount to unscientific
worldviews that hinder the progress of the society and ought to be
eradicated?
Eventually, this conference adopted a policy built around four
basic themes: (1) recognition of religion, (2) containment of
religious activity, (3) guidance of religious development, and (4)
suppression of nonsanctioned religions, or “evil cults.”87 Each of
these themes will be discussed in greater detail below. But before
doing so, it is important to understand the context in which these
themes were adopted.
Just prior to the Religious Work Conference, President Zemin
put forward a new theory called the “Three Represents” theory as
the CPC’s guiding principle.88 The “Three Represents” theory
suggested that the CPC represents (1) the best interests of the
Chinese people, (2) the most advanced productive forces, and (3)
the most advanced culture in China.89 In short, Zemin’s theory
portrayed the CPC as the only governing party for the goodness of
China. In 2002, the Sixteenth Party Congress formally adopted the
“Three Represents” theory as the party’s doctrine, thus requiring the
whole nation to integrate the doctrine as a guiding principle.90
Then, in the spring of 2003, the State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA) generated a series of study materials
incorporating the “Three Represents” theory into the new religious
policy drafted by the Religious Work Conference.91 This section

87. See generally Meeting Outlines China’s Policy on Religion for the New Century,
XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Dec. 13, 2001 [hereinafter Policy on Religion]; Pitman B. Potter,
Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China, 174 CHINA Q. 317, 323–24 (2003).
88. Constitution of the Communist Party of China, in DOCUMENTS OF THE 16TH
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 76 (2002).
89. For details, see http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/3represents/68735.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
90. Simon Pollock, Jiang Dropped from Communist Party’s Central Committee, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 14, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business (“The 16th Congress decided to
include Jiang’s ‘Three Represents’ theory in the party constitution, a move observers interpret
as helping to ease Jiang out by allowing him to leave behind an ideological legacy to guide the
party’s future development.”).
91. One of the most important articles drafted by SARA is Ye Xiaowen, Dui shehuizhuyi
zongjiao wenti de chongxin renshi shenke sikao [A Deep Reflection and a New Understanding of
Religious Issues in Socialist Society], 1587 LILUN DONGTAI [THEORETICAL DYNAMICS] 1
(2003). This journal is a classified publication issued by the party’s academy for internal
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paraphrases the new religious policy using Chinese Communist
rhetoric. First, because religion maintains longevity, the CPC should
actively guide religions to adapt to China’s socialist society. Second,
since the critical issue for religion is its mass nature (i.e., more than
200 million believers of various faiths in China),92 the CPC should
vigorously implement the party’s policy on religious belief. Third,
since religion is complex and unique, the CPC should emphasize the
legislative character of religious policy and stress the independent
nature of religion in China.93 As for nonsanctioned religions, it is
understood that they will be suppressed by legal and administrative
means. These themes are elaborated upon in the following sections.
A. Government Recognition of Religion and Mutual Adaptation
First, the Chinese government openly acknowledged that
religion has existed and will continue to exist as part of human
civilization.94 This acknowledgement was an admission that (1)
communism may not hold the absolute truth as previously asserted
by the party, and (2) religion is a cultural force that cannot be
eliminated by administrative measures.
The government’s policy did not address the thorny and
embarrassing issue of the nature of religion because such a discussion
would challenge the party’s fundamental interpretation of religion—
that is, if religion is a distorted worldview that might be expected to
disappear with social progress, as the party has insisted in the past,
the existence of religion in a developed society is a phenomenon that
refutes communism’s teachings on religion. To avoid dealing with
this inconsistency, the party took a pragmatic stance on religion,
similar to the party’s position on economic matters, which is to
adopt the market economy while baptizing it as “socialism with
Chinese characteristics.”95 Likewise, it is pragmatic for the
government to tolerate religion and to make the best use of it.96
circulation among the senior cadres. The subsequent study materials from SARA are all written
within the parameters established by this article.
92. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE REPORT, supra note 77.
93. See Lambert, supra note 54, at 124.
94. See generally Policy on Religion, supra note 87.
95. See Chai, supra note 17, at 168. (“The essence of Deng Xiaoping Theory is
called . . . ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics.’”); see also HSÜ, supra note 8, at
841–66.
96. Ye, supra note 91, at 3–4.
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Thus, the government does not encourage the development of
religion, but neither does it suppress religion by force.97
Instead, the party actively promotes the “truth”—scientific
materialism and atheism—to the masses.98 On this point, the new
policy stressed that there is a categorical difference between party
members and religious believers.99 Therefore, it emphasizes that no
religious believer can be a party member or vice versa.100 While the
party can take in capitalists as party members, no religious believer
can join the party because of ideological incompatibility.101
The government has repeatedly emphasized the message that
“religion must have mutual adaptation with socialist society.”102
Literally, this euphemism means that religion must adapt to the
Chinese socialist society in which it exists, and Chinese socialist
society must also adjust to the presence of religion. In reality,
however, the government defines what adaptation is required and by
what religion, to the point that religions sometimes have to change
or modify their teachings and practices in order to suit the political
objectives of the CPC.103 In other words, the party provides
guidance to religious groups, and these groups are obligated to
comply with that leadership.104 For example, one of the general
guidelines given to religious groups in China is that they help the
country’s economic development by introducing foreign investors to
97. See id.; Potter, supra note 87, at 323.
98. Ye, supra note 91, at 3–4.
99. See id.
100. Org. Dep’t of the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party, Circular
Concerning the Appropriate Resolution of the Issue of Communist Party Members Believing in
Religions (Jan. 28, 1991), translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 46; see also
Ye Xiaowen, China’s Religions: Retrospect and Prospect, CHINA NEWS & REP., Oct. 7, 2002, at
1, 8–9.
101. Jonathan Mirsky, Carey Homily Challenges China’s View on Religion, TIMES
(London), Sept. 19, 1994, LEXIS, News & Business (“‘The policy of freedom of religious
belief is not applicable to party members . . . . A Communist Party member cannot be a
religious believer.’” (quoting the Communist Party’s Document 19 of 1982)).
102. “Jiji yindao zongjiao yu shehuizhuyi xiang shiying.” Ye, supra note 91, at 6.
103. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 68, at 8.
104. In compliance with the government’s supervision over religious matters, some
religious groups in China began to change their constitutions to reflect this political reality.
For example, the China Christian Council (CCC) amended its constitution in May 2002 to
note that the “CCC accepts lawful administration by the Religious Affairs Bureau under the
State Council . . . .” The Constitution of the China Christian Council may be located online at
http://www.amityfoundation.org/ANS/Articles/ans2002.10/2002_10_7.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2004).
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China and by contributing to charitable projects and poverty
alleviation efforts.105
There are also specific guidelines for different religions. For
example, the government’s political guidance to the Protestant
church in anticipation of China’s accession to the WTO was
presented in SARA Director-General Ye Xiaowen’s opening address
at the Chinese Protestant Representative’s Conference, held in
Beijing in May 2002.106 There, he stressed that the Chinese
Protestant church must confront the many hostile religious groups
that may try to capitalize on WTO accession to gain a foothold in
China.107 Mr. Ye stressed that the Chinese church must step up its
anti-infiltration efforts to block this foreign invasion at the same time
it cultivates positive relationships with friendly foreign religious
bodies to promote the policies and achievements of China.108
This policy of political guidance reflects the government’s stance
that religion is simply one of many instruments it may use for
political advantage. According to the CPC, the government needs to
tightly control religion so that religion can become a positive social
force that contributes to the stability of the regime and society in
light of the many social changes caused by accession to the WTO.109
Chinese authorities also recognize that accession to the WTO may
trigger a new wave of foreign religious influence.110 In response, the
government is making every effort to resist such influence—a stark
contrast to the government’s policies regarding the economy and
commerce, where every effort is being made to embrace foreign
elements in order to ensure a smooth integration into the global
market.111
105. Lambert, supra note 54, at 127.
106. Ye Xiaowen, Opening Speech at the Seventh Chinese Protestant Representative
Conference (May 22, 2002), 4 RELIGION IN CHINA 11, 11–13 (2002).
107. Id.
108. See Mickey Spiegel, Editor’s Introduction, CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Mar.–Apr. 2000, at
4, 9–10.
109. Xiqiu (Bob) Fu, Guest Editor’s Introduction, CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Mar.–Apr.
2003, at 3, 4.
110. See Ye, supra note 106.
111. The new president of the CCC, Rev. Cao Shengjie, has issued a strong statement on
the “foreign infiltration” issue in a CCC/TSPM working report concerning the future
direction of the CCC in its relations with foreign religious groups. See Working Report of the
Executive Committee of TSMP/CCC, TIENFENG, July 2002, at 4–10. Similar remarks were also
heard at the national meeting of all the provincial church leaders responsible for foreign affairs
held at Shanghai in August 2002. This meeting emphasized the anti-infiltration issue, whereby
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B. Containment of Religious Activity

Second, because China’s religious believers number in the
hundreds of millions, the Party has adopted a policy of containment,
limiting religious activities to a defined area of operation.112
Theoretically, this is a policy affecting the freedom of religious belief,
not the freedom of religion. Under this policy, religion is tolerated
so long as it poses no threat to the ruling regime and no challenge to
established social institutions, such as education and marriage.113
Ultimately, the party’s containment policy is meant to keep religion
out of the sociopolitical domain.114
C. Emphasis on Legislation and Independence for Religious Groups
Third, the CPC has recognized that religion is far more complex
than previously asserted by party teachings. Religion is no longer
viewed simply as a distorted worldview held by the ignorant.115
Consequently, party officials now believe that administrative
issues regarding religion should be dealt with as objectively as
possible.116 And the enactment of legislation regarding religion has
provided the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) some objective criteria
to be used in handling religious issues.117
Furthermore, the CPC has recognized the complex interaction
that exists between religious bodies in China and their overseas
counterparts. In response to the increasing foreign contacts
stemming from China’s accession to the WTO, the CPC has begun
emphasizing both the independence of Chinese religious bodies and

churches were admonished to be wary of foreign Christian groups that would use the open
climate of WTO accession to gain footholds in China.
112. See, e.g., Five Provincial Regulations, supra note 66, at 60–68.
113. See XIANFA [Constitution] art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C.), translated in CONSTITUTION OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 33–35 (1983).
114. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 68, at 9–10.
115. Ye, supra note 91, at 4–6.
116. Han Fan, Chong yifa xingzheng kanduo zongjiao shiwu de guanli [Administration of
Religious Affairs in Accordance to Legislation], in CHINA RELIGION, Dec. 2003, at 32–33.
117. See generally Potter, supra note 87, at 325–26 (“The Constitution provides
authority for specific legislation on the matter of religion . . . . China’s regulatory provisions on
religion include measures of general application as well as edicts that apply to specific conduct
or beliefs.”). See also Han, supra note 116.
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the need for enhanced anti-infiltration action against foreign
missionary groups.118
These two themes, legislation and independence, have been
implemented and realized as follows. Currently, the government is
drafting nationwide and local religious regulations.119 It is also
currently understood that the government assumes the authority to
define by legislation what is a normal religion and what is not.120 In
practice, only those religions defined by the government as normal
can be allowed to exist legally in China and enjoy the freedoms
permitted by state policies and regulations. Those groups that do not
fall within the government’s definition of a normal religion, such as
Falungong, are considered evil cults to be prosecuted by law.121
Therefore, the government uses legislative means to confine
religious groups and their activities to a manageable level.122 For
example, there are laws and regulations that limit the involvement of
religion in the public domain. Religion, therefore, is kept separate
from education, marriage, civil affairs, social morality, and all other
areas of public domain that are under the party’s monopoly.123
In addition to legislation, all religious groups are governed by
various organizations falling under the supervision of the RAB.124
Thus, the government is expanding and upgrading the RAB in order
to meet the increasing demands placed on government resources as
religious activity grows in China. Therefore, the government is
118. Potter, supra note 87, at 325–32.
119. The government intended to draft a “Law on Religion” in the late 1980s, but the
legislation never materialized. See Chan Shun-hing & Lam Sui-ki, The Transformation and
Development of Church-State Relations in Contemporary China: A Case Study of the Catholic
Church, 3 CHING FENG: J. CHRISTIANITY & CHINESE RELIGION & CULTURE 93, 121
(2002).
120. Article 36 of the Constitution asserts: “The state protects normal religious
activities.” XIANFA [Constitution] art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C.), translated in CONSTITUTION OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 33–35 (1983). But nowhere in the documents is
“normal” defined or officially interpreted.
121. Legislative Resolution on Banning Heretic Cults, CHINA DAILY, http://www.amity
foundation.org/ANS/Religious%20Laws/reg4.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004); see also
MICKEY SPIEGEL, DANGEROUS MEDIATION: CHINA’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST FALUNGONG
(Human Rights Watch ed., 2002).
122. Potter, supra note 87, at 322.
123. CONTEMPORARY CHINA EDITORIAL BOARD, DANGDAI ZHONGGUO ZONGJIAO
GONGZUO [RELIGIOUS WORK IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA] (1999). Appendix 2 contains
relevant sections of the major documents affecting religion: the constitution, criminal law,
education law, the Basic Laws for Hong Kong and Macau, Decrees 144 & 145, etc.
124. See Potter, supra note 87, at 327.
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always aware of what is going on among the various religious
groups.125 Any group that resists the government’s supervision is,
legally speaking, considered to be an outlaw guilty of crimes against
the state.126 The government will feel secure only if religious activity
is closely supervised and monitored.
D. Suppression of Nonsanctioned Religions
Fourth, government officials have been alarmed at the
emergence of various new religious groups in China.127 Some of
these groups have been introduced by foreigners, such as Ba’hai,
while most are indigenous groups such as Falungong and Eastern
Lightning. These groups do not fall into the government’s narrowly
defined category of “normal” religions. Therefore, they are
considered illegal and are targeted for suppression as cults under
article 300 of the Criminal Law.128
Despite their illegality, these cults seem to attract ever increasing
numbers of followers, drawn mostly from the huge pool of
unemployed workers or poor, dissatisfied peasants who are given

125. Stephen J. Yates, China Promoting Freedom and Protecting American Security, in
ISSUES ’98: THE CANDIDATE’S BRIEFING BOOK 405, 413 (1998) (Stuart M. Butler & Kim
Holmes eds., 1998), http://www.heritage.org/research/features/ISSUES/98/chap15.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2004) (“[T]hrough a registration process, the government monitors
membership in religious organizations, meetings, religious training, clergy selection,
publication of religious materials, and funding for religious activities. This control [is] exercised
by the Religious Affairs Bureau . . . .”).
126. P.R.C. State Council, Regulations Governing Venues for Religious Activities (Decree
No. 145) (Jan. 31, 1994), http://www.amityfoundation.org/ANS/Religious%20Laws/
reg2.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004). This decree requires state approval for the establishment
of venues of religious activity. Registration requires having a suitable building, regular
meetings and attendance, proper organization, professional leadership, governing rules, regular
income, and payment of a registration fee. Many local regulations and memos have interpreted
Decree 145 to mean all sites not approved by the government are treated as illegal.
127. China’s State-Sanctioned Religious Groups Blast US Claims of Violations, AGENCE
FR. PRESSE, May 23, 2003, LEXIS, News & Business (“In recent years, [China] has cracked
down on a wide range of religious groups, including about a dozen mainly evangelical groups,
after it became alarmed by their popularity, including the Falungong, which the government
outlawed as a ‘cult’ in 1999.”); see also Ma Yuhong, Zai kuoda kaifang de xingshixia jianchi
duli zizhu ziban de yuanze [Uphold the Principle of Independent Self-Management Under the
Situation of Expanded Openness], 1587 LILUN DONGTAI [THEORETICAL DYNAMICS] 24, 24–
28 (2003).
128. Article 300 punishes the use of superstitious sects, secret societies, or evil cult
organizations to “undermine the implementation of the laws and administrative rules and
regulations of the State . . . .” CRIMINAL LAW, art. 300 (1997) (P.R.C.).

349

CHA-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2004 12:51 PM

[Summer 2004

hope by their teachings.129 Further, these suppressed religions may
echo the antigovernmental sentiments harbored by disenfranchised
citizens who believe that the government gave them a raw deal,
especially through accession to the WTO.
To the extent that such groups amplify latent antigovernment
sentiment, these new religious groups may become a destabilizing
force that undermines the government’s authority and potentially
even the legitimacy of the regime through eschatological religious
teachings.130 Fully aware of such danger, the government spares no
expense to suppress these groups, justifying its action on the basis of
political and national security rather than on the basis of religion.131
Technically speaking, the Chinese government views the suppression
of officially unrecognized religious activities, not as an issue of
religious liberty but as an issue of national security or criminal law
enforcement.132 The government has already established a special
task force within the Public Security Bureau to target these “evil
cults.”133 It is expected that there will be more government
campaigns to suppress these religious groups as an increasing
number of Chinese discontented by the negative economic impact of
accession to the WTO join these groups.134
V. THE FUTURE OF THE RELIGION-STATE DYNAMIC IN CHINA
Historically, the Chinese civil government has consistently
exercised authority in security matters without regard for religious
concerns, demonstrating the superiority of state authority over
religion.135 The Chinese civil authority has traditionally taken a
nonreligious stance with regard to state ideology, be it Confucianism
129. Lambert, supra note 54, at 127; see also Bays, supra note 72, at 502.
130. Potter, supra note 87, at 336–37.
131. See Nat’l Pub. Sec. Bureau, Notification on Certain Questions Regarding the
Identification and Elimination of Evil Cults (Apr. 30, 2000), http://www.china21.org (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004).
132. See, e.g., CRIMINAL LAW, art. 300 (1997) (P.R.C.).
133. See Luo Bing, The Secret Plot to Suppress Falun Gong: The Inside Story, CHINESE L. &
GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 91; Fu, supra note 109, at 5, 11.
134. See http://www.china21.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) for a report on the
increasing number of arrests related to unregistered religious groups.
135. See Kim-Kwong Chan, A Chinese Perspective on the Interpretation of the Chinese
Government’s Religious Policy, in ALL UNDER HEAVEN: CHINESE TRADITION AND CHRISTIAN
LIFE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 38–44 (Alan Hunter & Don Rimmington eds.,
1992).
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or communism.136 Furthermore, China has always been a pluralistic
country with no single religion dominating others.137 Therefore,
individual religious groups have always occupied a minority position
within the society.138
The civil authority once regarded its control over religion as a
sacred mandate that it had to maintain in order to be a responsible
government and to keep a harmonious society.139 As a result, the
government did not tolerate any group, including religious ones,
that challenged its political authority. Nor did the government allow
disharmony to exist among religious groups, for such disharmony
could destabilize society at large.140 So long as a religious group
supported the current regime and remained within its state-defined
role, the civil authority would tolerate its existence.141
This model of church-state relations has been in practice for
almost two thousand years in China, with perhaps a few brief
exceptions.142 And, unlike Western history, in which religion has
consistently been one of the major factors contributing to war, there
have been very few religiously motivated wars in Chinese history.143
There is little evidence to suggest that the present regime will
forsake its policy of state control over religion in favor of other
models, nor is there any evidence to suggest that China will be the
scene of major interreligious conflicts in the days to come. Yet, as
this Article has demonstrated, China’s accession to the WTO will
forever change many aspects of Chinese society. This section
discusses the government’s likely response to the burgeoning
religious movement in China. In particular, this Article argues for (1)
136. R. Lanier Britsch, The Current Legal Status of Christianity in China, 1995 BYU L.
REV. 347, 348 (1995).
137. Ye, supra note 100, at 2.
138. See RELIGION UNDER SOCIALISM IN CHINA, supra note 43, at 31–32; Potter, supra
note 87, at 317.
139. See RELIGION UNDER SOCIALISM IN CHINA, supra note 43, at 147 (“[T]he . . .
ultimate goal for dealing with religious questions is to unite all religious believers and
nonbelievers, and to focus their will and strength on the common goal of building a strong
socialist nation. [Thus,] . . . our religious work has gradually turned onto the road of
promoting social stability and unity . . . .”); see also Chan, supra note 135, at 38–44.
140. See Fu, supra note 109, at 4–7.
141. Id.
142. See Britsch, supra note 136, at 348; Ye, supra note 100, at 2.
143. The Taiping Rebellion is a contemporary example that devastated half of the
country in the late nineteenth century. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, GOD’S CHINESE SON: THE
TAIPING HEAVENLY KINGDOM OF HONG XIUQUAN (1996).
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greater influence of religious organizations over social policy, (2)
increased interaction between religion and nongovernmental
organizations or so-called “third sector” groups, and (3) a gradual
restructuring of the institutions regulating religion and a steady
loosening of state control over religious observance in China.
A. The Influence of Religion over Social Policy
China’s accession to the WTO will trigger a greater flow of
overseas capital, resources, personnel, and ideas into China.144 Many
Chinese may encounter different state-religion relationships as they
are exposed to societies in other countries.145 Religious adherents in
China may soon become aware that there are many potential forms
of church-state relationships and that religious groups can perform
roles other than the traditional subservient model currently practiced
in China.146
Thus, as a result of China’s accession to the WTO, religious
groups in China may seek an influence in society comparable to their
counterparts in other countries, even in spite of attempts by Chinese
authorities to curb religious activity and to confine institutions
within a specified framework.147 However, the influence of religious
values can extend beyond what government legislation and
regulation can control, particularly with regard to the social values
and moral imperatives that must always remain outside the reach of
statutory law. Consequently, as China is exposed to other parts of
the world, religious groups in China may begin to search for a new
model of church-state relations, and the influence of religion in
China will likely begin to move beyond the traditional institutional
framework. Thus, a new church-state orientation could be more
tolerant of various religious expressions and more accepting of
religious involvements in the sociopolitical arena.
With an ever-changing post-accession society, China will face
drastic social upheaval as the general population experiences
paradigm shifts in virtually all spheres of life, from housing to travel
144. Lambert, supra note 54, at 127.
145. As increasing numbers of Chinese are traveling or residing overseas, they are
inevitably exposed to different religion-state contexts.
146. For example, religious groups in many countries, such as India or the United States,
can have more social involvement, such as running educational institutions, than their
counterparts in China.
147. Lambert, supra note 54, at 127.
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and from employment to marriage.148 There will be segments of the
population that will gain economically from such changes while
other segments will lose. Disenfranchised unemployed workers,
internal migrant laborers, bankrupt farmers, and poor pensioners will
need to find some means to release their frustration and
dissatisfaction as well as seek some relief from their desperate
situations.149 Religion is a readily available means to endow such
people with love, care, patience, and hope to confront daily
hardships with grace and dignity.150 Religion may also be used to
channel individual dissatisfaction and anger into a powerful political
force by those who would either transform society by violent means,
or use extreme eschatological teachings to escape from reality.151
Thus, religion in China can turn into a two-edged sword: a social
shock absorber or a destabilizing agent. If new religious groups can
succeed where the state has failed in satisfying the political
aspirations of the Chinese people, it is possible that some of these
groups may turn from docile communities into a radical
revolutionary movement.152 Thus, as an ever-increasing number of
Chinese embrace religion, this double-edged sword becomes sharper
and sharper, and it may become a challenge for the Chinese
government to effectively handle this powerful two-edged sword.
B. The Interaction of Religious Organizations with
Other Third Sector Groups
Other than religious groups, there are many nongovernmental
and civil organizations emerging in China, including charitable
groups, consumer rights groups, environmental groups, advocacy
groups, and independent think tanks.153 These organizations have
148. The government has passed many new pieces of legislation to reflect the changing
social institutions in China, one of which is the new marriage law. See Kim-Kwong Chan, A
New Marriage Law in China, 4 CHINASOURCE 1, 4–7 (2002).
149. Christiansen, supra note 30, at 186.
150. See the case studies in chapters 5 and 8 of TETSUNAO YAMAMORI & KIM-KWONG
CHAN, WITNESSES TO POWER: STORIES OF GOD’S QUIET WORK IN A CHANGING CHINA
(2000).
151. See Potter, supra note 87, at 332–37.
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Environmental Law with Chinese Characteristics, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 545, 562–65 (2003); Dinah PoKempner, Human Rights & Nongovernmental Organizations: Asia’s Activists and the Future of Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 677 (1997).
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already gained a social foothold by establishing institutions for their
nonreligious activities. Given the opportunity for religion to play a
more participatory role in Chinese society, religious groups will have
more influence among the population at large, especially with regard
to social services and economic development.154 In doing so,
religious groups and religiously based charitable organizations will
soon join this emerging class of social groups referred to as the
“third sector.”155
The effect these new groups will have on the Chinese
sociopolitical system is somewhat uncertain.156 However, religious
groups within the sector will likely become more popular as they
increase their involvement in society. Furthermore, some religious
groups—including the Protestants and the Catholics—are well
organized and have networks of authority extending beyond the
regional level to places most current third sector groups cannot
reach.157 With national networks and international connections,
religious groups could be an important element within the third
sector to advocate important causes both nationally and
internationally.158 A new alliance may be established, for example, to
promote environmental issues between environmental groups,
religious groups, and commercial developers. Through such
alliances, the third sector has the potential to play a decisive role in
China’s sociopolitical arena. And religious groups are poised to take
a leading role in forming and directing the social agenda of these
alliances.159

154. Through social services and economic development projects, religious groups can
have a chance to contact people they were hitherto unable to reach due to restrictions on
religious activities.
155. Carol Hamrin, Advancing Religious Freedom: Prospects and Prescriptions, in GOD
AND CAESAR IN CHINA: CHURCH-STATE TENSION IN CHINESE POLITICS AND U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS (J. Kindroff & C. Hamrin eds., forthcoming 2004) (using the phrase “third
sector” to denote civil groups in China that are neither under the government’s control nor
part of the private commercial sector).
156. See Potter, supra note 87, at 332–37.
157. See Bays, supra note 72; Richard Madsen, Catholic Revival During the Reform Era,
174 CHINA Q. 468 (2003).
158. See Bays, supra note 72; Madsen, supra note 157, at 474.
159. See Bays, supra note 72, at 501–02 (“China has finally joined the World Trade
Organization. . . . This might constitute an opportunity for further expansion of Protestantism
in China . . . . The size, resources and virtually nation-wide presence of the Protestant
movement makes it one of the most important of non-governmental entities in China today.”).
This is yet to be seen in China. However, such social phenomena are common in developing
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C. Relaxation of Government Control over Religion

The government is moving in the right direction as it anticipates
the emergence of various religious issues in post-accession China. On
one hand, Chinese authorities want to tackle religion by pursuing
the traditional policy of containment and control. On the other
hand, Chinese society is changing so radically and rapidly that there
is little hope of containing religion and its influences by force or
legislative means.160 The more the government tries to control
religion, the more likely it is that religion will turn into a
destabilizing force by going underground and drawing discontented
social elements to turn against the regime. The more Chinese
authorities try to limit international relations in the religious arena,
the more various religious and missionary groups will attempt to gain
access to China by infiltration. However, if the government allows
more freedom and demonstrates more tolerance towards various
religions not currently recognized in China, religious groups may
become a stabilizing factor that will help to absorb many social
shocks caused by accession to the WTO and other economic forces.
The more Chinese authorities encourage international religious
contact and relationships, the more Chinese religious groups will be
stimulated to develop their own unique national identities. Greater
ecumenical dialogue between nations will in turn require less reliance
on foreign religious groups and diminish the need for infiltration.161
In addition, the advancement of various religions into a truly diverse
expression of faith and conviction can facilitate China’s effort to
achieve a more pluralistic and democratic society. By cultivating a
society with sound moral foundations, China will fulfill a necessary
criterion for a developed and civilized society.162
It will take a lot of courage for Chinese authorities to restructure
the system under which religion is administered in China, some
aspects of which date back to the Soviet era. For some Chinese
authorities, surrendering state control over religion is akin to
opening a Pandora’s box of issues hitherto unencountered in China’s

countries as faith-based nongovernmental organizations are often at the forefront of social
programs, similar to the prominent role of Caritas or World Vision in leading developing
projects in many countries. See Madsen, supra note 157, at 474.
160. Potter, supra note 87, at 332–33.
161. See Ye, supra note 91, at 7.
162. See Potter, supra note 87, at 336.
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history. However, the time is ripe for change since China’s very
concept of religion is based on an outdated European model of
religion inherited from Judeo-Christian religious institutions. But as
a result of China’s accession to the WTO, this and countless other
aspects of Chinese society are likely to change.
VI. CONCLUSION
As China’s economy assimilates into the international economic
order via the WTO, Chinese society, too, will merge with the
international community in its culture, trends, lifestyles, knowledge,
and religious traditions. As a consequence of accession, religion in
China may take on a more international role as religious groups seek
closer ties with their international counterparts.163 It is inevitable that
tensions will emerge between the newly christened religious groups
as the government tries to keep abreast of widespread social
transformation. The Chinese government should realize the
importance of religious liberty in establishing a stable social
environment. It should adopt a new policy towards religion by
loosening its internal and international control over religion. Such a
move would signal China’s coming-of-age, religiously as well as
economically, as it joins the global community as a major player in
the international economic scene.

163. See Spiegel, supra note 108, at 9–10.

356

